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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to October 1, 2006, a primary residential parent' in Florida re-
quired court approval for the relocation and modification of custody under
old section 61.13(2)(d).' Section 61.13001, titled "Parental Relocation with
a Child" replaced section 61.13(2)(d) on October 1, 2006.' A primary resi-
dential parent, including domestic violence victims, must follow the re-
quirements of section 61.13001 if they intend to relocate with their children.4
* Patricia McKenzie is a J.D. Candidate, May 2007, at the Shepard Broad Law Center,
Nova Southeastern University, in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She earned her B.S. in Criminal
Justice from Georgia State University in 1997. Ms. McKenzie wishes to thank her mom
Marlene Davy, Inez "Mammy" Hyde, and Professor Jane E. Cross for their support and en-
couragement. She would also like to thank the 2006 Goodwin Lecture Series Professors and
Fellows for their inspiration. Special thanks to Professor Tim Arcaro for his guidance with
this project. This article was written in honor of Kaylynn Nicole McCarthy, for her great
sacrifices!
1. According to Florida's statute titled "Parental Relocation with a Child," a "primary
residential parent . . . [is] a person so designated by court order or by an express written
agreement that is subject to court enforcement or ... the person seeking to relocate with a
child." FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(1)(f) (2006).
2. Id. § 61.13(2)(d) (2005) (amended 2006).
3. Id. § 61.13001 (2006); Echezarreta v. Echezarreta, 944 So.2d 1169, 1169-70 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
4. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(2)(a), (3) (2006). "If the primary residential parent and the
other parent ... entitled to visitation with the child agree to the relocation," or "[u]nless an
agreement has been entered as described in subsection (2), a parent who is entitled to primary
residence of the child shall notify the other parent .... of a proposed relocation of the child's
principal residence." Id.
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An issue that arises is whether section 61.13001 will provide timely and
effective relief to domestic violence victims5 seeking to relocate, in order to
protect themselves and their children. First, this note highlights national and
local domestic violence statistics and the effect of domestic violence on chil-
dren. Second, this note discusses the evolution of custody determinations
and Florida's most recent standards for determining custody on relocation.
Third, this note evaluates the language and possible application of Florida's
new relocation statute to a hypothetical. Finally, this note recommends a
more practical approach for domestic violence victims seeking to relocate
with their children.
Domestic violence in the United States is the leading cause of injury to
women. 6 "In 2001, women accounted for 85 percent of the victims of inti-
mate partner violence."7 Even if women develop the courage to divorce their
spouses to escape these abusive relationships, the abusers stalk and continue
to threaten or intimidate them.8 One finding suggests that "[80] percent of
women who are stalked by former husbands are physically assaulted by that
partner and 30 percent are sexually assaulted by that partner." 9
In 2005, Florida reported 120,386 incidents of domestic violence.' 1 Of
those reported incidents, approximately 54% were committed by a spouse or
co-habitant." Simple assaults 2 represented 75% of the total number of inci-
dents, and of those, 57.5% were committed by a spouse or co-habitant. 3
5. One court defined a domestic violence victim as a person who was physically harmed
or was threatened with imminent harm from another person. Farrell v. Marquez, 747 So. 2d
413, 414 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
6. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 255 (2003) (citing
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 631 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)).
7. Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Facts on Domestic Violence,
http://www.endabuse.org/resources/facts/DomesticViolence.pdf (last visited May 15, 2007).
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. Statewide Domestic Violence, 1992-2005, http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/fsac/Crime_
Trends/download/pdf/dv offensesstatewide.pdf (last visited May 15, 2007).
11. See Domestic Violence Victim Totals by Offense, 1992-2005,
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/fsac/CrimeTrends/download/pdf/I 992_2005dvvictimoffense.
pdf (last visited May 15, 2007) (of a total of 120,386 reported offenses in 2005, 29,181 were
committed by a spouse and 36,000 by a co-habitant).
12. Assault is defined as "an intentional, unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to
the person of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which
creates a well-founded fear in such other person that such violence is imminent." FLA. STAT.
§ 784.011 (2006). "[S]imple assault is a necessarily lesser included offense of aggravated
assault." Cannon v. State, 456 So. 2d 513, 514 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
13. See Domestic Violence Victim Totals by Offense, supra note 11 (citing 90,455 re-
ported simple assaults in 2005, of which 23,166 were committed by a spouse and 28,857 by a
co-habitant).
[Vol. 31
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There were 21,676 aggravated assaults14 reported and 46.4% were commit-
ted by a spouse or co-habitant. 5
In addition, there were 254 incidents of aggravated stalking,1 6 of which
55.5% were committed by a spouse or co-habitant. ' 7 A spouse or co-habitant
committed 45% of all simple stalking incidents and 48.8% of all incidents of
threat or intimidation.' 8 There were 176 criminal homicides and 51.7% were
committed by a spouse or co-habitant. 9
The effects on children are more devastating. There are children under
the age of twelve in more than half of the households where female victims
face intimate violence.2" "Between 3.3 and 10 million children witness some
form of domestic violence annually."'" "[Fifty] percent of the men who fre-
quently assault[] their wives also frequently abuse their children., 22 Further,
"[c]hildren who are exposed to domestic violence are more likely to exhibit
behavioral and physical health problems including depression, anxiety, and
violence towards peers. 23
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of Custody
In the 1800s, the single criterion for determining who got custody of a
child was the sex of the parent. 24 The paternal preference rule was a rebut-
table presumption in favor of the father.25 The child was believed to be the
14. Aggravated assault is defined as "assault [w]ith a deadly weapon without intent to
kill, or [w]ith an intent to commit a felony." FLA. STAT. § 784.021(1).
15. See Domestic Violence Victim Totals by Offense, supra note 11.
16. For aggravated stalking, the defendant must "knowingly, willfully, maliciously, and
repeatedly follow[] [or] harass[] the victim," and the defendant must do so in violation of
either an injunction for protection against repeat violence, an injunction for protection against
domestic violence, or any other court imposed prohibition of conduct toward the victim or her
property. FLA. STAT. § 784.048(4).
17. See Domestic Violence Victim Totals by Offense, supra note 11.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Facts on Domestic Violence, supra note 7.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Family Violence Prevention Fund, The Facts on Children and Domestic Violence,
http://www.endabuse.org/resources/facts/Children.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).
24. Melissa M. Wyer et al., The Legal Context of Child Custody Evaluations, in PSY-
CHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS: KNOWLEDGE, ROLES, AND EXPERTISE 6-7
(Lois A. Weithorn ed., 1987).
25. Id. at 7.
2007]
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property of the father.26 Therefore, "the father had exclusive rights to the
child ... based on his obligation to protect and financially support the mi-
nor."
27
In 1881, Justice Brewer, and then Justice Cardozo in 1925, rejected the
right of the parent as primary." In Finlay v. Finlay,29 Justice Cardozo wrote
that the judge "is to put himself in the position of a wise, affectionate, and
careful parent and make provision for the child accordingly."" °  Subse-
quently, the maternal preference rule developed and the burden of proof then
rested on the father to prove the mother was unfit.3 So long as the mother
was fit to be the parent, she was the best provider of attention, devotion, and
love during the period of nurture.32 Mothers frequently got children of ten-
der age and minor girls of any age, while fathers got custody of adolescent
boys.3"
Today, most jurisdictions have abolished a presumption in favor of ei-
ther parent in a custody determination.34 Many, including Florida, now use
some version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act's (UMDA) "best
interests of the child" factors for custody determinations.35
On making custody determinations, judges are faced with finding the
least detrimental alternative, on a case-by-case basis.36 In addition, judges
exercise great discretion in custody determinations because of limited evi-
dence and also because the legislature provides little guidance on how to use
26. Id
27. Id. at 6-7.
28. Id. at 7.
29. 148 N.E. 624 (N.Y. 1925).
30. Id. at 626. (citations omitted).
31. Wyer et al., supra note 24, at 7.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 8-9.
35. Id. at 10. Section 402 of the UMDA states that in determining the best interests of
the child:
The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect his rela-
tionship to the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998).
36. Wyer et al., supra note 24, at 9.
[Vol. 31
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each factor or what weight to give each factor.37 In addition, these decisions
may be appealed only on grounds of abuse of discretion.38
B. Custody Determinations in Florida
A child custody determination is a "judgment, decree, or other order of
a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, residential care, or
visitation with respect to a child.,, 39 The court's jurisdiction is invoked if the
child resides in the state for at least six months prior to the filing or proceed-
ing,4° if the home state has declined to exercise jurisdiction, or if no other
state has jurisdiction. 4' These custody determinations include modifications
of custody.42
A modification is a child custody determination4 3 that changes or re-
places the initial custody arrangement." So long as it concerns the same
child it is called a modification.45 Florida courts have continuing jurisdiction
over the initial determination until the child or the parents have severed their
connections with the state, until there is a lack of substantial evidence of "the
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships" available in
Florida, or until the parents and the child are no longer residents of Florida. 6
A primary residential parent's relocation may be restricted by statute or
by settlement agreement.47 Relocation determinations are usually treated as
modifications.4" "In a relocation case ... courts are guided by explicit and
implicit ideas of the appropriate roles for men and women. 49 Usually, these
ideals are not reflective of post-divorce reality,5" perhaps because the "best
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10.
39. FLA. STAT. § 61.503(3) (2006).
40. Id. § 61.514(1)(a). "'Child custody proceeding' means a proceeding in which legal
custody, physical custody, residential care, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue.
The term includes a proceeding for divorce ... and protection from domestic violence ... 
Id. § 61.503(4).
41. Id. § 61.514 (1)(a)-(b).
42. Id. § 61.503(3).
43. FLA. STAT. § 61.503(1 1). "'Initial determination' means the first child custody de-
termination concerning a particular child." Id. § 61.503(8).
44. Id. § 61.503 (11).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 61.515(l)(a).
47. Katherine C. Sheehan, Note, Post-Divorce Child Custody and Family Relocation, 9
HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 135, 136-37 (1986).
48. See id. at 137.
49. Id. at 136.
50. Id. at 143.
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interests of the child" are also used to determine whether to modify cus-
tody. "
Prior to October 1, 2006, Florida courts made determinations for modi-
fication on relocation based on section 61.13(2)(d) of the Florida Statutes,
which stated in pertinent part: "No presumption shall arise in favor of or
against a request to relocate when a primary residential parent seeks to move
the child and the move will materially affect the current schedule of contact
and access with the secondary residential parent."52
The statute also delineated certain factors that courts must consider be-
fore approving relocation. 3 These factors were adopted by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Mize v. Mize.54 The Court held that judges should con-
sider and weigh factors such as:
1) Whether the move would be likely to improve the general
quality of life for both the primary residential spouse and the chil-
dren;
2) Whether the motive for seeking the move is for the express
purpose of defeating visitation;
3) Whether the custodial parent, once out of the jurisdiction,
will be likely to comply with any substitute visitation arrange-
ments;
4) Whether the substitute visitation will be adequate to foster
a continuing meaningful relationship between the child or children
and the noncustodial parent;
5) Whether the cost of transportation is financially affordable
by one or both of the parents; [and]
6) Whether the move is in the best interests of the child. 5
Additionally, in 2005, the Supreme Court of Florida approved the "sub-
stantial change" test. 6 The party seeking modification of the custody ar-
rangement must show "(1) that the circumstances have substantially and ma-
terially changed since the original custody determination, and (2) that the
51. Id. at 137.
52. FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(d) (2005) (amended 2006).
53. Id. § 61.13(2)(d)(1)-(6). In 1993, the Supreme Court of Florida rendered a decision
that adopted these same factors from a prior lower court decision. Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d
417, 420 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam), superseded by statute, FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(d) (1997).
54. 621 So. 2d at 417.
55. Id. at 420 (quoting Hill v. Hill, 548 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
56. Bazan v. Gambone, 924 So. 2d 952, 955 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Wade v.
Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 931 (Fla. 2005), overruled on other grounds, Briscoe v. Briscoe,
927 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
[Vol. 31
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child's best interests justify changing custody." 57 All requests for modifica-
tion, whether adopted by a court after agreement or those established during
a hearing for custody, were subject to the "substantial change" test.5"
Domestic violence complicates these determinations.59 Even more
complicated is that on occasion, custody determinations may be made in a
domestic violence proceeding. 60 As the following case demonstrates, a me-
chanical application of the law will not be effective with domestic violence
cases.
In the case of O'Neill v. Stone,6 1 custody of the unmarried couple's
child was awarded to the mother in a proceeding on "a ... petition for in-
junction for protection against domestic violence. 62  O'Neill, the mother,
then relocated to New Jersey.63 In response, Stone, the father, "filed an
emergency motion seeking the return and temporary custody of the child."'
Stone obtained a pick-up order but O'Neill immediately retained counsel and
filed a motion to set aside that order.65 During that hearing, the trial court
refused to hear testimony regarding domestic violence and ordered the child
returned to Florida.66 The Second District Court of Appeal held that the trial
court abused its discretion by not hearing the testimony on domestic vio-
lence.67  In addition, the appellate court opined that the trial court should
have considered the relocation issue and the factors under old section
61.13(2)(d) at the time O'Neill motioned to set aside the pick-up order.68
Florida has a strong public policy against domestic violence.69  "It is
now widely recognized that domestic violence 'attacks are often repeated
57. Id. (citing Wade, 903 So. 2d at 931 n.2).
58. Id. at 955-56.
59. See O'Neill v. Stone, 721 So. 2d 393, 395 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
60. See id. at 394 (custody order directed after mother filed "a standardized petition for
injunction for protection against domestic violence pursuant to section 741.30").
61. Id. at 393.
62. Id. at 394.
63. Id.
64. O'Neill, 721 So. 2d at 394.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 394-95 (the trial court refused testimony because of insufficient time and did
not allow Robin O'Neill's former employer, babysitter, and sister to testify at the hearing).
67. Id. at 396. "We hasten to add that our reversal should not be read as approval for a
custodial parent to disobey visitation orders." Id. The court disapproved of the domestic
violence proceeding being used in this manner--only for temporary custody and support
orders. See O'Neill, 721 So. 2d at 396.
68. Id. at 395-96. These factors would include any evidence of domestic violence at
which time the trial court would have been compelled to consider the testimony of O'Neill's
former employer, babysitter, and sister. See id
69. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1052-53 (Fla. 1999), superseded by statute,
FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2005).
2007]
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over time, and escape from the home is rarely possible without the threat of
great personal violence or death."' 7 The executive branch of the govern-
ment of Florida "established a task force on domestic violence, whose pur-
pose is the issuance of reports and recommendations which document 'the
extent of our awareness, and the responsiveness of our resources to battered
women and their families.'' So does that mean the relocation statute in-
corporates the grave concerns of the state?
III. DISCUSSION
A. "Parental Relocation with a Child"
Florida's new statute on parental relocation is a very detailed statute.
Outfitted with its own list of definitions, this statute makes clear the proce-
dure for relocating with a child. However, domestic violence victims may
not find timely or effective relief under this statute.
This new statute is codified under Chapter 61 of the Florida Statutes.72
The purposes delineated in Chapter 61 include the promotion of "amicable
settlement of disputes that arise between parties to a marriage and [t]o miti-
gate the potential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the proc-
ess of legal dissolution of marriage."73  How does that apply to someone
seeking relief from domestic violence, who seeks to escape violence with
their child?
Section 61.13001 defines the primary residential parent of the child as
"the person seeking to relocate with a child," absent a court order or an
agreement designating one parent as the primary residential parent."4 Under
this section, "'change of residential address' means the relocation of a child
to a principal residence more than [fifty] miles away from his or her principal
place of residence at the time of the entry of the last order establishing...
custody."75 Relocation is defined in this section as a change of residence for
sixty consecutive days.76
The statute indicates that the first method of relocation is by agree-
ment.77 The primary residential parent may relocate if he or she has reached
70. Id. at 1053 (quoting State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997)).
71. Id. at 1055 (quoting Executive Office of the Governor, The Governor's Task Force
on Domestic Violence, The First Report (January 31, 1994)).
72. FLA. STAT. §§ 61.001-61.45 (2006).
73. Id. § 61.001(2)(b), (c).
74. Id. § 61.13001(1)(f).
75. Id. § 61.13001(1)(a).
76. Id. § 61.13001(1)(h).
77. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(2)(a).
[Vol. 31
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 10
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss2/10
2007] CUSTODY, RELOCATION, AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 363
an agreement with the secondary residential parent.78 This agreement must
define "the visitation rights [of] the nonrelocating parent," "any transporta-
tion arrangements related to the visitation," and the nonrelocating parent
must have signed the agreement.79 The parties must get court approval of the
agreement, and a hearing will only be held if requested."
If there is no agreement for relocation between the parents, then the pri-
mary residential parent who wants to relocate must give "Notice of Intent to
Relocate" to the other parent. 81 The Notice must include a description of the
intended new residence, new home telephone number, the intended date of
relocation, specific reasons for the relocation, and a proposed revised visita-
tion schedule.8 2 "The mailing address of the parent .. seeking to relocate"
must be included and the contents are not privileged. 83 The parent seeking to
relocate must also prepare a "Certificate of Filing Notice of Intent to Relo-
cate."84 In addition, the relocating parent must also provide any changes in
address, phone numbers, or any other information required. 5
Furthermore, pursuant to the statute, each Notice must include an "ob-
jection clause". 6 If no objection is filed within thirty days, the relocation is
presumed to be "in the best interest of the child., 87 However, if an objection
is timely filed, the parent seeking to relocate with the child has the burden of
proving the relocation is in the best interests of the child, among other
things. 8 Under this statute, there is no presumption in favor of either parent
for modification due to relocation. 89  The statute then requires that courts
78. Id. This statute also requires consent from "every other person entitled to visitation
with the child." Id.
79. Id. § 61.13001(2)(a)(1)-(3).
80. Id. § 61.13001(2)(b).
81. FLA. STAT. §61.13001(3). This section also requires that "every other person entitled
to visitation with the child" be informed of the proposed relocation. Id.
82. Id. § 61.13001(3)(a)(1), (3)-(6).
83. Id. § 61.13001(3)(a)(8).
84. Id. § 61.13001(3)(c).
85. See Fla. STAT. § 61.13001(3)(d).
86. Id. § 61.13001(3)(a)(7). This statement must appear in the notice:
AN OBJECTION TO THE PROPOSED RELOCATION MUST BE MADE IN WRITING,
FILED WITH THE COURT, AND SERVED ON THE PARENT OR OTHER PERSON
SEEKING TO RELOCATE WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF THIS NOTICE OF
INTENT TO RELOCATE. IF YOU FAIL TO TIMELY OBJECT TO THE RELOCATION,
THE RELOCATION WILL BE ALLOWED, UNLESS IT IS NOT IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE AND WITHOUT A
HEARING.
Id.
87. Id. § 61.13001(3)(e).
88. See id.
89. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7). This section was incorporated from section 61.13(2)(d) of
the 2005 version of the Florida Statutes.
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determine custody based on: 1) the nature and quality of the relationship
with the primary residential parent; 2) the age, developmental stage, and
needs of the child; 3) the likely impact of relocation; 4) the maintenance of
continuing contact with the other parent; 5) the child's preference,9" 6) the
reasons for and against relocation; 7) career opportunities available to the
objecting parent or relocating parent; 8) a history of domestic violence;9 and
9) "[a]ny other factor affecting the best interest of the [child]. 92
If the relocating parent fails to file a Notice before relocating, the relo-
cating parent is subject to contempt and may be compelled to return the
child.93 In addition, the court will consider the failure to timely file the No-
tice, along with the unauthorized removal of the child from the jurisdiction,
as factors in determining whether to approve relocation. 94 The court will
also consider the unauthorized removal when it determines whether to
change primary residential custody or to modify visitation.95 Moreover, the
relocating parent may be ordered to "pay reasonable expenses and attorney's
fees" for the objecting parent. 96
B. Interpretation and Analysis
There are some critical factors that will affect the interpretation of sec-
tion 61.13001 of the Florida Statutes.97 Even though one parent is the pri-
mary residential parent, family law seeks to keep the child in contact with
both parents as much as possible. 98 But "when women who are victims of
90. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7)(a)-(k) (2006). The courts will take into consideration the
child's preference depending on the age and maturity of the child. Id. § 61.13001(7)(d).
91. Id. As defined in the 2005 version of the Florida Statutes, "'Domestic Violence'
means any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual bat-
tery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offence
resulting in physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or
household member." Id. § 741.28(2) (2005). Subsection 3 defines "'Family or household
member' [as] spouses, former spouses, [or] persons related by blood or marriage." Id. §
741.28(3).
92. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7) (2006).
93. Id. § 61.13001(3)(f).
94. Id. § 61.13001(3)(e)-(f)(1).
95. See id. § 61.13001(3)(f(2).
96. Id. § 61.13001(3)(f)(4).
97. See Mize v. Mize, 621 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1993) (per curiam), superseded by stat-
ute, FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(d) (1997).
98. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b) (1989)).
[Vol. 31
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domestic violence separate from ... their abusive partners," they are faced
with an unexpected one-sided application of the law.99
Domestic violence victims may need welfare assistance and may have
to separate from their children for a while.' Such circumstances may cost
them custody of their children, as domestic violence victims are sometimes
labeled "bad mother[s]" and may face criminal charges for failure to protect
their children.'0 ' These women may also have to defend themselves in cus-
tody proceedings against their abusers. 102 In addition, if a domestic violence
victim escapes with her children and flees the jurisdiction, she may have a
defense to the criminal charge of custodial interference.' 
03
It is [now] a defense that... [t]he defendant was the victim of an
act of domestic violence or had reasonable cause to believe that he
or she was about to become the victim of an act of domestic vio-
lence ... and the defendant [believed] ... that the action was nec-
essary in order for the defendant to escape from, or protect himself
or herself from, the domestic violence or to preserve the minor...
from exposure to the domestic violence. 104
The legislature intends for Chapter 61, "Dissolution of Marriage; Sup-
port; Custody", to be liberally construed.'05 A liberal interpretation of a stat-
ute commands an expansive interpretation of the words.'0 6 This also indi-
cates that the legislature intended that judges exercise great discretion in de-
termining the meaning of the statute. 1
07
One recent case states, in a footnote, that under section 61.13001, "the
relocation of children is always open to judicial scrutiny."10 8 This case im-
99. Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare
"Reform " Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 743-44 (1998).
100. See id. at 744.
101. See id.
102. See id.at 745.
103. See FLA. STAT. § 787.03(2), (4)(b) (2006).
In the absence of a court order determining rights to custody... any parent of the minor...
who has custody [of the child] and who takes, detains, conceals, or entices away that minor...
with malicious intent to deprive another person of his or her right to custody of the minor...
commits a felony of the third degree....
Id. at § 787.03(2).
104. Id. § 787.03(4)(b).
105. Id. § 61.001(1).
106. See RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 55 (2002).
107. See id.
108. Echezarreta v. Echezarreta, 944 So.2d 1169, 1169-70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
In this case, the Third District Court of Appeals did not decide the relocation issue under
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plies that trial courts may exercise great discretion in custody and relocation
cases. '09 Another case explains that appellate review of those decisions is
subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.1 ' Abuse of discretion
"means that '[i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action
taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be
no finding of an abuse of discretion."""... Also, "the test of reasonableness
requires [a determination of] whether there is 'logic and justification' for
the" trial court's finding. 1
2
Consider the following hypothetical. 113 T.F. wants to relocate with her
twenty-month-old daughter, K.F., because of abuse T.F. experienced from
her former husband, F.H.'" Prior to their separation, F.H. reportedly had a
"history of harassment, physical harm and [an] uncontrollable temper."" 5
There were two main reports of violence experienced by T.F.116 The first
occurred on Mothers' Day in 1994.117 Family members arrived at the cou-
ple's house that day and met F.H. running out of the house, saying that they
had "better get in the house before he tore off his wife's head."" 8 F.H. later
admitted to his sister-in-law that "he hit his wife again."' ' F.H. also partici-
pated in the Family Violence Intervention Program, but the violence did not
stop. 120
The second incident occurred in October 1994.121 This time F.H. threw
T.F. on the floor and "kick[ed] her in the chest, ribs and legs."' 122 T.F. man-
aged to call the police and fled the house out of fear for her safety and the
safety of K.F. 123 T.F. is now the primary residential parent of her daugh-
section 61.13001 because the settlement agreement incorporated the previous statute section
61.13(2)(d). Id. at 1170.
109. See id.
110. See Hamilton v. Hamilton, 922 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
111. Id. (quoting Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980)).
112. Id. at 267 (quoting Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203). In this case, the court found that
the trial court abused its discretion by placing the child with the mother who was proven to be
an alcoholic. Id. at 268.
113. This hypothetical is based upon the case of Ford v. Ford. 700 So. 2d 191 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
114. See id. at 192-93.
115. Id. at 192.
116. Id. at 193.
117. Id.
118. Ford, 700 So. 2d at 193.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Ford, 700 So. 2d at 193.
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ter, 124 but F.H. continues to harass, stalk and attempt to abuse T.F. with every
opportunity. T.F. wishes to relocate to a neighboring state to ensure that she
and K.F. are safe.
Is section 61.13001 the appropriate statute for analysis of this hypo-
thetical? The title of Section 61.13001 is helpful for determining the legisla-
tive intent at the time it was enacted. 125 This statute is entitled "Parental Re-
location with a Child."' 126  The statute goes on to define relocation and
change of residence address. 127 In addition, the statute's main focus is on the
child. 128 Each section of the statute concerns the child or holds the child as
the subject. 129 The primary residential parent is the parent seeking to relo-
cate with the child or the one so designated by a court. 130 It is fair to deduce
then, that T.F. must comply with the provisions in section 61.13001, if she
intends to relocate with K.F.
Will T.F. find timely and effective relief under section 61.13001? The
problem presented above is complicated further because the primary residen-
tial parent is also a domestic violence victim. Let's consider the possibility
of agreement, whether there are any issues with the magnitude of disclosure
required under the statute, and whether the application of subsection 7(j) is
sufficient for timely and effective relief under the statute.
First, T.F. is unlikely to reach an agreement for relocation with F.H. An
agreement to relocate may promote amicable settlement between the parties,
which is the purpose of Chapter 61. However, even with a liberal construc-
tion, and based on a plain reading"' of the statute, T.F. will only provoke
F.H. to heightened physical abuse if she attempts to reach an agreement for
relocation. 132 This section fails for domestic violence victims because
124. Id. at 197. The appellate court reversed the trial court decision and made the mother
the primary residential parent of the child. See id. The mother appealed from the settlement
agreement made a part of the final judgment and decree of dissolution on the initial custody
determination. See id. at 192.
125. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 106, at 99. "Courts... will generally use an act's
title as an aid in resolving an ambiguity in the act's text," but here it is used as a starting point
and in conjunction with the text to reveal when this statute is applicable. Id.
126. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001 (2006).
127. Id. § 61.13001(1)(a), (h).
128. See id. §61.13001.
129. See generally id.
130. Id. §61.13001(l)(f).
131. Here, "the plain meaning is merely the first consideration in dealing with legislative
intent, and it will control unless a convincing argument is made that the legislature intended
otherwise based on the other methods of statutory interpretation." BROWN & BROWN, supra
note 106, at 42.
132. See generally FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(2).
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"[d]omestic violence is about power and control." 13 3 If T.F. moves to a
neighboring state, F.H. will have less control over her. The likely effect of
an attempted agreement is heightened abuse. 134 The facts suggest that the
abuse in the past has been unprovoked. 135 Any attempt to reach an agree-
ment for relocation may provoke F.H., which could result in more harm to
T.F. and K.F.
T.F. may consider serving a "Notice of Intent to Relocate" on F.H.1
36
However, the Notice requires disclosure of address, phone number, descrip-
tion of the intended new residence, and specific location. 137 This document
must also have the date of intended move and specific reasons for the
move.'38 T.F. seeks to protect herself from harm and to protect the couple's
child from the effects of domestic violence. Service of the Notice in this
instance is also likely to result in heightened abuse. In addition, F.H. will
know her intended location once he receives the Notice. This is very likely
to defeat the purpose of her relocating. F.H. has previously arranged for her
vehicle to be repossessed in the middle of the night. "' His behavior indi-
cates that he is persistent and determined. F.H. is likely to follow T.F. to her
new location and continue harassing and abusing her.
Perhaps the statute provides some relief for T.F. with regard to disclo-
sure of her location. Section 61.13001(4) states, "[i]f the parent ... is enti-
tled to prevent disclosure of location information under any public records
exemption applicable to that person, the court may enter any order necessary
to modify the disclosure requirements of this section in compliance with the
public records exemption."'' 40 In this case, the applicable public records ex-
emption is found in section 741.465, titled "Public Records Exemption for
the Address Confidentiality Program for Victims of Domestic Violence."''
section 741.401 reveals that the legislature recognizes the need for domestic
violence victims to "establish new addresses in order to prevent their [abus-
ers] from finding them."'' 42 The purpose of the exemption is to enable ad-
133. The National Center for Victims of Crime, Domestic Violence,
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/main.aspx?dbName=DocumentViewer&DocumentlD=32347 (last
visited May 15, 2007).
134. See id.
135. See Ford v. Ford, 700 So. 2d 191, 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(3)(a).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Ford, 700 So. 2d at 194.
140. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(4).
141. Id. § 741.465.
142. Id. § 741.401. It is titled "Legislative Findings; purpose" and is related to Florida
Statutes sections 741.401-.409. Id.
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dress confidentiality, and allow state and local law enforcement to work with
the attorney general's office to protect the identity and location of partici-
pants. 143
Only on a showing of a valid arrest warrant, court order, or cancellation
of certification will the participant's address, telephone number, and social
security number be revealed.'44 There are no application fees to become a
participant and the attorney general is required to certify the exemption once
a properly completed application is filed.'45 The applicant then becomes a
participant for four years. 146 The certified address can be a school address,
work address, or residential address. 147 However, certification may be can-
celled by a change of name or residential address, or if forwarded mail from
the attorney general is returned as undeliverable from the certified address. ' 4
8
This is a problem for T.F. because if she applies for certification now, it
will be for her current address. The statute is unclear, but it seems to suggest
that if relocation is granted to her, after she moves, the certification will be
cancelled and the new address will then be available to the public, including
F.H. 149 That seems to defeat the purpose of keeping the records confidential,
so that F.H. is not able to find T.F.
For T.F., the time to get certification and wait for an objection to the re-
location notice could be months. 150 The statute on the confidentiality pro-
gram does not indicate how long it will take a victim to obtain certifica-
tion. "' However, assuming that T.F. is a program participant, she still has to
wait thirty days from the date of filing to see if F.H. will object to the reloca-
tion. 152 F.H. could inflict more harm to T.F. during these waiting periods.
Assuming T.F. passes the disclosure hurdle or decides to take her
chances, F.H. now files a timely objection to T.F.'s intended move. Section
61.13001 fails again, because once an objection is filed, T.F. must "initiate
court proceedings to obtain court permission to relocate."' 53  F.H. is now
aware of T.F.'s intentions, which makes it more likely that F.H. will either
threaten or try to harm her in an attempt to change her mind. He may even
143. See id.
144. FLA. STAT. § 741.465(1).
145. Id. § 741.403(2), (3).
146. Id. §741.403(3) (2006).
147. Id. § 741.402(1).
148. Id. § 741.404(2).
149. See FLA. STAT. § 741.404(2).
150. Id. §§ 741.401-.409.
151. Id. §§ 741.401-.409.
152. See id. § 61.13001(5).
153. Id. § 61.13001(3)(e).
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try a different approach. For example, he may apologize profusely as in the
"honeymoon" phase of the cycle of violence. '54
In addition, T.F. may have to defend herself later at the hearing, to de-
termine custody on relocation.'55 Most women end up on the defensive at
these hearings, despite the abuse they have experienced because of their "un-
fit" image due to the abuse. 156 In addition, the statute indicates that T.F. has
the burden of proof to show that relocation is in the best interest of the
child. '57 F.H. will not want to lose control, so he will fight for custody and is
likely to do everything to destroy T.F.'s image before the court, as he tried
before when alleging T.F. was withholding visitation privileges. '58
At the hearing, the court is likely to apply the factors delineated in the
relocation statute.' 59 The court will consider evidence of a "history... of
domestic violence. ' 60 However, this factor raises many questions. It pro-
vides hope to parent victims, but is silent as to what types of evidence may
be introduced and how much weight will be attributed to this factor in the
court's determination.' 6' History is defined as a "chronological record of
significant events."' 162 So what comes in as support for T.F.'s position? The
courts are unpredictable in this area, or in custody determinations, for that
matter. 1
63
This is not good for T.F., who seeks timely and effective relief from
abuse. However, this decision rests in the hands of judges who have so
154. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 65 (1979). The cycle of violence
typically has three phases. See id. at 55-70. The first is the tension building phase, where the
victim is nervous and needs to watch her moves while the abuser is getting angry and commu-
nication breaks down. See id. at 56-59. The second stage is the incident. See id. at 59-65.
This is where the abuser acts out on the victim and commits a crime of domestic violence. Id.
The third stage is the honeymoon phase. WALKER, supra at 65-70. During this phase, the
abuser seeks pity or apologizes profusely to pull the victim back into the relationship. Id. at
65-66. Next, there is often calm before the tension building phase begins again. See id. at 70.
Here, the abuser may not act against the victim and may behave like there was no abuse. See
id.
155. See Murphy, supra note 99, at 745.
156. See id.
157. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(8) (2006).
158. See Ford v. Ford, 700 So. 2d 191, 196 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
159. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7)-(8). Failure by T.F. to comply with procedures "may be
taken into account by the court in any initial or post-judgment action seeking a determination
or modification of the designation of the primary residential parent or of the residence, cus-
tody, or visitation with the child." Id. § 61.13001(3)(0.
160. See id. § 61.13001(7)0).
161. See id.
162. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 573 (1988).
163. See generally PSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS, supra note 24, at
4-5.
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much discretion that they are likely to weigh the factors differently depend-
ing on the circuit or county.' 64 It is likely that based on the "best interest of
the child" language in the statute, 165 and if the statute is to be read with other
provisions in Chapter 61,166 then the abuse from F.H. towards T.F. will be
considered and perhaps heavily weighed by the court.
Another issue with the application of the factors included in section
61.13001 is the "substantial change" test. 167 The Supreme Court of Florida
adopted the "substantial change" test in addition to the factors codified in
section 61.13(2)(d) and now, with minimal revisions, in section 61.13001.68
This test allows the trial court to modify custody if the party seeking the
modification can show "(1) that the circumstances have substantially and
materially changed since the original custody determination, and (2) that the
child's best interests justify changing custody."' 69
F.H., in this case, would have to prove that T.F.'s circumstances have
"substantially and materially changed" and that her relocation would not be
in the best interest of K.F. 170 If the goal is shared parenting, then the presid-
ing judge will be attentive as to how the relocation will affect the child.'7
The complication, and perhaps the flaw, lies with the focus of the statute.
Since the focus of section 61.13001 is the child, 72 the domestic violence
victim runs the risk of being seen as unstable. She may be required to keep
moving to get away from her abusive ex-spouse. She may be forced to
change jobs often, because the ex-spouse creates problems for her while at
work. If the focus is on the victim first, or contemporaneous with the child's
interests, then the analysis will change.
164. See id.
165. FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(3)(e).
166. BROwN & BROWN, supra note 106, at 89. "[A]ny language in the statute is to be read
in light of the whole statute, not just a portion of it." Id.
167. Bazan v. Gambone, 924 So. 2d 952, 955 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
168. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7).
169. Bazan, 924 So. 2d at 955 (citing Wade v. Hirschman, 903 So. 2d 928, 931 n.2 (Fla.
2005), overruled on other grounds, Briscoe v. Briscoe, 927 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2006)).
170. See id.
171. See FLA. STAT. § 61.13001(7).
172. See generally id. § 61.13001.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Florida's "Parental Relocation with a Child" statute focuses on the best
interest of the child. '73 In addition, the statute furthers the purpose of Chap-
ter 61, which promotes amicable resolutions and shared parenting.'74 Section
61.13001(2), when read together with section 61.001(2), for internal consis-
tency,175 reveals that the goal of the agreement section and the thirty-day
objection period is to allow for parents to amicably settle their issues outside
of court.176 For most parents, the new relocation statute helps them save on
attorney fees and costs, allowing the parents more autonomy in the decisions
concerning where their children will live. So long as the parents are able to
reach an agreement, whether initially or after a Notice of Intent to Relocate
has been served on the other parent, they may be said to have autonomy.
The focus on the parents is misplaced for domestic violence victims,
however. The child's best interest remains paramount. However, the parent
victim must be considered as a priority either before the child or with the
child. 177 One court emphasizes that a child "[w]atching, hearing, or even
later learning of a parent being abused by a partner threatens a child's sense
of stability and security .... In order to minimize the risk of long term dam-
age, the safety and security of a child's environment needs to be restored."
7 8
A survey of jurisdictions in the United States reveals that some states
consider the safety and well-being of both the parent and the child in their
custody determinations. 17' Alabama and Arkansas have gone so far as to
enact a rebuttable presumption that it is detrimental, and not in the best inter-
est of the child, to be placed in sole or joint, legal, or physical custody with
the perpetrator of domestic violence.' Florida's domestic violence statute,
in section 741.2902, explains that the safety of the child and the parent are
173. See id.
174. Id. § 61.001(2)(b)-(c).
175. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 106, at 86. "[A]n interpretation that produces internal
consistency in the statute is to be favored over an interpretation that produces internal incon-
sistencies." Id. at 86-87.
176. See FLA. STAT. §§ 61.001, .13001(3), (7).
177. See id § 61.13001(7)0).
178. D.R. v. Dep't. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 898 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2005).
179. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-132 (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(a)
(West 2004) (discussing the health, safety, and welfare of the child); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-
215(a)(1) (1987).
180. ALA. CODE § 30-1-131 (LexisNexis 2006) (determination raises rebuttable presump-
tion that custody with perpetrator detrimental to child); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-215(2)(c)
(1987).
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paramount in domestic violence proceedings."'8 These proceedings allow for
the determination of temporary custody arrangements. 8  It is unclear
whether the courts should have the same focus in a determination concerning
relocation.
Further, Florida has a criminal penalty in place for anyone who inter-
feres with custody. 183 Even though proof of domestic violence is now a de-
fense to this crime,1 84 without clear relief in the relocation statute, the victim
parent may feel trapped because of the possibility of punishment. Other ju-
risdictions have enacted a remedy instead, which states that if one parent is
absent from the jurisdiction, or relocates because of an act of domestic vio-
lence, and that parent was not the perpetrator of the violence, the absence or
relocation without court approval shall not be a factor that weighs against the
relocating party in determining custody or visitation. 1
85
A remedy for the loopholes in Florida's relocation statute would be to
include the following provisions:
(a) The safety and well-being of each child and each parent is para-
mount to all other factors. '86
(b) Upon a finding of domestic violence, there is a rebuttable presump-
tion that it is detrimental, and not in the best interest of the child, to be placed
in sole, joint, legal or physical custody with the perpetrator of domestic vio-
lence. 187 The standard of proof for an act of domestic violence is by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 1
88
(c) No presumption applies if both parents have committed an act of
domestic violence against each other.' 89
(d) A finding of domestic violence constitutes a substantial change in
circumstances that warrants a custody determination in favor of the victim or
the victim's parent who is not the perpetrator. 190
181. FLA. STAT. § 741.2902(l) (2006).
182. Id. § 741.2902(2)(d), (e).
183. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
184. FLA. STAT. § 787.03(4)(b).
185. E.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-132(b) (LexisNexis 2006); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-
403.03(I) (2000 & Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b) (2005); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 9-15-215(2)(b) (1987).
186. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-132(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2006); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011(a)
(West 2004) (using the language of the "health, safety, and welfare of the child," which is
currently missing from the Florida relocation statute); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-215(a) (1)
(1987).
187. ALA. CODE § 30-1-131 (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that determination raises rebut-
table presumption that custody with perpetrator detrimental to child); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-
215(c) (1987).
188. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-215(c) (1987).
189. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(D) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
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(e) If one parent is absent from the jurisdiction or relocates because of
an act of domestic violence, and that parent was not the perpetrator of the
violence, the absence or relocation without court approval shall not be a fac-
tor that weighs against the relocating party in determining custody or visita-
tion. " In addition, because of those acts of violence, the relocating parent
may not be subject to the criminal statute for "Interference of Custody" so
long as they are able to satisfy the standard of proof. 1
92
(f) The court may review evidence from any of the following sources:
"l)[flindings from another court of competent jurisdiction; 2) [p]olice re-
ports; 3) [m]edical reports; 4) [c]hild protective services records; 5)
[d]omestic violence shelter records; 6) [s]chool records; [and] 7) [w]itness
testimony."' 93
These provisions should be incorporated into Chapter 61 of the Florida
Statutes, in particular to section 61.13001, to ensure that parent victims are
clear on what they may do to escape violence and protect themselves and
their children. The above provisions alone may not provide the absolute
remedy. However, if accurately incorporated and applied by the courts,
these provisions may provide timely and effective relief to domestic violence
victims who are primary residential parents relocating for safety. At the very
least, it should be clear to judges what types of evidence parties can consider
to prove that domestic violence exists during a custody, modification, or re-
location hearing.
190. ALA. CODE §30-3-134 (LexisNexis 2006). "In every proceeding in which there is at
issue the modification of an order for custody or visitation of a child, a finding that domestic
or family violence has occurred since the last custody determination constitutes a finding of
change in circumstances." Id.
191. ALA. CODE § 30-3-132(b) (LexisNexis 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §25-403.03(1)
(2000 & Supp. 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2(b) (2005) ("If a party is absent or
relocates with or without the children because of an act of domestic violence, the absence or
relocation shall not be a factor that weighs against the party in determining custody or visita-
tion."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-15-215(b) (1987).
192. See FLA. STAT. § 787.03(4)(b) (2006).
193. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.03(C)(1)-(7) (2000 & Supp. 2006).
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